信息公告-詳情
鮑威爾表示，「政策調整的時機到了 （The time has come for policy to adjust）。前進的方向是明確的，減息的時機和步伐將取決於接下來的數據、不斷變化的前景以及風險的平衡」。 Today， I will begin by addressing the current economic situation and the path ahead for monetary policy. I will then turn to a discussion of economic events since the pandemic arrived， exploring why inflation rose to levels not seen in a generation， and why it has fallen so much while unemployment has remained low. Let's begin with the current situation and the near-term outlook for policy. Our restrictive monetary policy helped restore balance between aggregate supply and demand， easing inflationary pressures and ensuring that inflation expectations remained well anchored. Inflation is now much closer to our objective， with prices having risen 2.5 percent over the past 12 months.2 After a pause earlier this year， progress toward our 2 percent objective has resumed. My confidence has grown that inflation is on a sustainable path back to 2 percent. Today， the labor market has cooled considerably from its formerly overheated state. The unemployment rate began to rise over a year ago and is now at 4.3 percent—still low by historical standards， but almost a full percentage point above its level in early 2023. Most of that increase has come over the past six months. So far， rising unemployment has not been the result of elevated layoffs， as is typically the case in an economic downturn. Rather， the increase mainly reflects a substantial increase in the supply of workers and a slowdown from the previously frantic pace of hiring. Even so， the cooling in labor market conditions is unmistakable. Job gains remain solid but have slowed this year. Job vacancies have fallen， and the ratio of vacancies to unemployment has returned to its pre-pandemic range. The hiring and quits rates are now below the levels that prevailed in 2018 and 2019. Nominal wage gains have moderated. All told， labor market conditions are now less tight than just before the pandemic in 2019—a year when inflation ran below 2 percent. It seems unlikely that the labor market will be a source of elevated inflationary pressures anytime soon. We do not seek or welcome further cooling in labor market conditions. The time has come for policy to adjust. The direction of travel is clear， and the timing and pace of rate cuts will depend on incoming data， the evolving outlook， and the balance of risks. The Rise and Fall of Inflation The arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic led quickly to shutdowns in economies around the world. It was a time of radical uncertainty and severe downside risks. As so often happens in times of crisis， Americans adapted and innovated. Governments responded with extraordinary force， especially in the U.S. Congress unanimously passed the CARES Act. At the Fed， we used our powers to an unprecedented extent to stabilize the financial system and help stave off an economic depression. Congress delivered substantial additional fiscal support in late 2020 and again in early 2021. Spending recovered strongly in the first half of 2021. The ongoing pandemic shaped the pattern of the recovery. Lingering concerns over COVID weighed on spending on in-person services. But pent-up demand， stimulative policies， pandemic changes in work and leisure practices， and the additional savings associated with constrained services spending all contributed to a historic surge in consumer spending on goods. Enter inflation. After running below target through 2020， inflation spiked in March and April 2021. The initial burst of inflation was concentrated rather than broad based， with extremely large price increases for goods in short supply， such as motor vehicles. My colleagues and I judged at the outset that these pandemic-related factors would not be persistent and， thus， that the sudden rise in inflation was likely to pass through fairly quickly without the need for a monetary policy response—in short， that the inflation would be transitory. Standard thinking has long been that， as long as inflation expectations remain well anchored， it can be appropriate for central banks to look through a temporary rise in inflation. For a time， the data were consistent with the transitory hypothesis. Monthly readings for core inflation declined every month from April to September 2021， although progress came slower than expected. The case began to weaken around midyear， as was reflected in our communications. Beginning in October， the data turned hard against the transitory hypothesis. Inflation rose and broadened out from goods into services. It became clear that the high inflation was not transitory， and that it would require a strong policy response if inflation expectations were to remain well anchored. We recognized that and pivoted beginning in November. Financial conditions began to tighten. After phasing out our asset purchases， we lifted off in March 2022. High rates of inflation were a global phenomenon， reflecting common experiences： rapid increases in the demand for goods， strained supply chains， tight labor markets， and sharp hikes in commodity prices. The global nature of inflation was unlike any period since the 1970s. Back then， high inflation became entrenched—an outcome we were utterly committed to avoiding. At this podium two years ago， I discussed the possibility that addressing inflation could bring some pain in the form of higher unemployment and slower growth. Some argued that getting inflation under control would require a recession and a lengthy period of high unemployment. I expressed our unconditional commitment to fully restoring price stability and to keeping at it until the job is done. The summer of 2022 proved to be the peak of inflation. The 4-1/2 percentage point decline in inflation from its peak two years ago has occurred in a context of low unemployment—a welcome and historically unusual result. Pandemic-related distortions to supply and demand， as well as severe shocks to energy and commodity markets， were important drivers of high inflation， and their reversal has been a key part of the story of its decline. The unwinding of these factors took much longer than expected but ultimately played a large role in the subsequent disinflation. Our restrictive monetary policy contributed to a moderation in aggregate demand， which combined with improvements in aggregate supply to reduce inflationary pressures while allowing growth to continue at a healthy pace. As labor demand also moderated， the historically high level of vacancies relative to unemployment has normalized primarily through a decline in vacancies， without sizable and disruptive layoffs， bringing the labor market to a state where it is no longer a source of inflationary pressures. This narrative attributes much of the increase in inflation to an extraordinary collision between overheated and temporarily distorted demand and constrained supply. While researchers differ in their approaches and， to some extent， in their conclusions， a consensus seems to be emerging， which I see as attributing most of the rise in inflation to this collision. All told， the healing from pandemic distortions， our efforts to moderate aggregate demand， and the anchoring of expectations have worked together to put inflation on what increasingly appears to be a sustainable path to our 2 percent objective. That is my assessment of events. Your mileage may vary.
▲ 美國減息｜鮑威爾發表減息宣言 「政策調整時機已到」 對通脹持續回到2%的信心增強